

- Studies in areas related to the Army LCMCs
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The Road Ahead

As we transition from summer to fall and close out FY06, I am amazed at how much more our workforce accomplished this year with significantly less in terms of people, time and money. As an organization, we have truly taken an integrated, holistic approach to supporting a Nation at war while transforming the Current Force. It just goes to show how effectively organizations can operate when they communicate requirements across the workforce and pull together as a team to get the job done. FY07 should prove equally challenging from a human and fiscal resources standpoint, but we have implemented new business practices from the lessons learned this past year that will help us work more efficiently and effectively in the months ahead. The directive guidance handed down from the highest levels of Army leadership, to include the Army acquisition community's senior leaders, has motivated us to become better stewards of the Army's limited resources during a time when our Nation is waging a multidimensional war. We have developed methods to help us avoid unnecessary costs and to better streamline our procurement and production processes to eliminate potential waste, outmoded ways of doing business and duplication of effort.

Obviously, the Army can't afford to use the same processes that require past levels of resources. By implementing new initiatives and methodologies across the board, the Army is striving to build on its past year successes through continued innovation, targeted cost-cutting measures and sound, carefully engineered processes. In equipping the world's best Army, we cannot afford to overlook any processes or methodologies that might put our Soldiers at risk. Accordingly, our clear challenge for the road ahead is to continue to fulfill our moral obligations to our Soldiers to the best of our collective ability each and every day and, through our selfless service, honor the men and women who have answered our Nation's highest "call to duty" wherever they put "boots on the ground." For the good of the Soldiers we support and the Nation we serve, let's continue the great momentum we've established and keep pulling together to make FY07 an even better year.



Craig A. Spisak
Director, U.S. Army
Acquisition Support Center

Worth Reading

Arguing about War

Michael Walzer
Yale University Press, 2004



Reviewed by Scott Curthoys, a retired U.S. Army military intelligence and foreign area officer. He is currently working as a counterintelligence analyst contractor for a federal agency.

The factors that enabled past declarations of war by Congress — an unambiguous threat to our collective security, the clarity of national purpose in the face of that threat and the ease with which we are able to identify the enemy through his symbols and uniforms — have become difficult to discern in an ever-more complicated international landscape. Therefore, it is now the president who decides when, where and, most importantly, for what purpose to commit U.S. forces to combat. It is this last point that stirs the most emotion in Americans.

The reason for sending U.S. forces into harm's way is the single most important consideration in the president's decision. He must make a convincing argument to the U.S. people as to why other diplomatic options will not suffice and troops must be dispatched. Moreover, once troops are sent, the president must be able to exert leverage over the swirling forces the deployment has unleashed: casualties, cost to the treasury, events within the combat zone, world opinion and the actions of the state we are committed to support while at the same time reinforcing the just nature of the deployment.

The world in 2006 is not as simple as it was in 1942. The moral ambiguity of the Vietnam War and decay in the

government's general credibility trigger our reactive senses — along the entire political spectrum — upon hearing arguments about employing force. Complicating this situation is the nature of contemporary conflict. Whereas the first Gulf War stood out as a clear case of using force to counter aggression, other scenarios such as ethnic cleansing, unfriendly or potentially dangerous regimes, peacemaking and defending a government against internal forces of change are messy and do not always yield moral clarity. The decision by the president to apply force in these situations requires an argument deeper and more persuasive than simply ill-defined national interest.

In his book *Arguing about War*, author Michael Walzer revisits the arguments he first presented in his seminal work, *Just and Unjust Wars*. In this new book, a collection of previously published essays, Walzer examines the moral standing of war as a human activity but does not take a political side himself. He asserts that war is sometimes justifiable (an argument rejected by pacifists) and that the conduct of war is always subject to moral criticism (an assertion denied by realists who believe that all is fair in war).

Arguing about War is divided into three sections. In the first section, Walzer examines the theory of just war. His essay concerning emergency ethics is particularly relevant in this age of constant terrorist threats. In it, the author looks at the moral constraints that govern a state's actions in war (for example, not targeting civilians) and how these rules can be overridden in what Winston Churchill called times of "supreme emergency." Another essay, in which Walzer critiques the excuses often proffered for terrorism, contains observations and analyses that add to our still limited understanding of the terrorist threat.

The second section is an examination by Walzer of several recent conflicts, including the first Gulf War, Kosovo and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. Although Walzer was writing this book as the current conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan was unfolding, he is critical of President George W. Bush's preventive war. The difference between preventive and preemptive war is a key concept in the theory of just and unjust wars. A genuine preemptive war begins with a decision by a state to strike at an enemy that it knows is about to attack. A classic example is Israel's decision to attack in 1967 before its Arab neighbors launched their attack on Israel. In contrast, a preventive war is one that is begun in response to a much more distant threat that may or may not materialize in the fullness of time. A speculative example may be an Israeli attack on Iran in response to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The threat to Israel is not immediate, but distant; not certain, but uncertain.

In applying the just war theory, as Walzer does, one sees that with preventive wars there are measures that can be taken — short of armed force — to counter the threat. Applying this theory, the reader may conclude that the containment measures in place in Iraq before the American attack, although faulty, were successful enough for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq, making an attack unnecessary.


In addition to actions taken prior to and during a conflict, Walzer extends the theory of just war to cover actions after a conflict. He argues that moral intentions and behavior after a war are just as important as the decision to make war. In the third — and shortest — section of the book, Walzer discusses several possible global political arrangements in an attempt to highlight the ones that will promote a global society of nations in which war might play a less significant role. This section may strike many as a fanciful journey into the improbable. Yet, his analysis of the different arrangements gives the reader reason to pause.

Those who have read Walzer's earlier work detect an evolution in the author's thinking that parallels the increasing complexity of contemporary conflict. Walzer has, in fact, become more willing to call for military intervention after watching the application and effects of organized violence in places like Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan and East Timor. In the book, the author makes the observation that by using force as a last resort, states have an excuse for postponing the use of force indefinitely.

As more and more voices join the debate about the United States' actions in Iraq, the relevance of Walzer's arguments becomes clearer. The ideas in this book can inform and enlighten all viewpoints as this Nation collectively argues about a war.

Guns, Germs, and Steel The Fates of Human Societies

Jared Diamond
W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1997, New York



Reviewed by Michael J. Varhola, an author of several history books and a former editor at Army AL&T Magazine.

For those who want or need to understand why the world is the way it is today, one of the most useful and influential books of the

past decade has undoubtedly been Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel*. Subtitled *The Fates of Human Societies*, this book has its genesis in the early 1970s. While traveling in New Guinea, the author asked a local political leader the following question: "Why do some countries become industrialized and then dominate others and not the other way around?" Diamond strives to answer that question in this book.

"History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples' environments," Diamond explains, "not because of biological differences among people themselves." In other words, the title advantages that allowed some cultures to dominate others were not indicative of racial superiority, greater average intelligence or higher levels of initiative or energy — they were products of the regions in which those cultures originated.

Diamond, the product of a multidisciplinary academic education, draws upon his background in physiology, evolutionary biology and biogeography to seek the root causes of what led some cultures to dominate others. These causes, he maintains, do not have their origins in cultural differences, which are only proximate symptoms of the factors that ultimately spawned those cultural differences.

Thus, Diamond looks not just at the prima fascia events surrounding how guns, germs and steel allowed some peoples to dominate others, he explores what primordial factors led them to acquire those advantages in the first place. While it is important to understand how a handful of soldiers from Spain destroyed the Inca Empire, for example, it is just as important to understand why a force from the aggressively militaristic Inca Empire did not travel to Spain and depose its ruler instead.

While firearms and steel weapons and armor played a significant role in head-to-head confrontations between invaders technologically superior to their indigenous opponents — along with oft-cited psychological factors — Diamond does present some striking data that germs sometimes played an even more telling, if often invisible, role.

"Throughout the Americas," he writes in one example, "diseases introduced with Europeans spread from tribe to tribe far in advance of the Europeans themselves, killing an estimated 95 percent of the pre-Columbian Native American population." When figures like that are compared with the significantly more modest ones projected for the imminent bird flu pandemic that has so many world governments concerned at the moment, the destabilizing effects those diseases must have had upon indigenous peoples start to become apparent.

Despite its many merits, this book has been dismissed merely as "Geography 101" by some (i.e., some of those who have read it) and as racist by others (i.e., some of those who have not actually read it at all). The first dismissal is half true, but does not do justice to the lucid, incisive way in which Diamond makes his case. Sure, a lot of what he says is "obvious," none of it is a secret, but disregard of the obvious things he discusses have led people in general, and policymakers in particular, to draw some painfully incorrect conclusions over the years.

The second dismissal has no merit at all, and actually flies in the face of Diamond's thesis. Race-based conclusions about why the world is the way it is are something the author both rejects and consciously attempts to disprove in this book. *Guns, Germs, and Steel* does, unfortunately, have a few weaknesses. Much of what Diamond writes about is martial in nature. For example, while he is not guilty of any major factual errors, some of his verbiage is likely to grate upon the ears of knowledgeable military readers. For example, he makes reference to "slingshots" rather than "slings" — the former being the Y-shaped instrument of mischief most often associated with Dennis the Menace, the latter a braided or leather strap used to hurl stone or metal slugs at high velocities and employed in hunting and warfare for at least 10,000 years.

In another instance, Diamond refers to GEN George Custer's defeat at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876. Custer was at that point, however, a lieutenant colonel and had not worn stars on his epaulets for 10 years, having been demoted as part of the U.S. Army's dramatic reduction in force after the Civil War's conclusion.

In another chapter, Diamond contends that "the Incas, like all other foot soldiers, were never able to defeat cavalry in the open." While infantry with access to equal or inferior technology have often failed to prevail against cavalry, numerous significant examples can be found to invalidate the use of the word "never," including the Scottish pikemen who defeated English knights at the Battle of Bannockburn, the English longbowmen who cut down French knights at the Battles of Agincourt and Crecy and the British infantry squares that repulsed attack after attack by French cuirassiers at the Battle of Waterloo.

Like many academics, Diamond knows that he will look like a dummy and weaken his arguments if he is sloppy in the ways he discusses such esoteric subjects as languages, food production or social organization. He is markedly less attentive, however, in his use of military facts and terminology.

Ultimately, however, this is a minor criticism in a book that brilliantly illuminates both the reasons the world we live in is the way it is and the importance of understanding those reasons. And for those who hope to play even a minor or supporting role in shaping the outcomes of the events that will define the 21st century, understanding the root causes that have brought us to where we are today is indispensable.

Contracting Community Highlights



This issue's feature article highlights continued post Hurricane Katrina rebuilding by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Continuing the Army humanitarian precedent of previous rebuilding projects, USACE and FEMA teamed with other agencies to supplement their contracting workforce. The Army team included the Army Contracting Agency-Northern Region, Facilities Engineering Team 28 and USACE. This team reported to the Baton Rouge (LA) Recovery Field Office ready to rebuild Southern University at New Orleans' (SUNO) campus. We appreciate the sacrifices made by our Soldiers and civilians in successfully accomplishing a project of such magnitude. Using innovative contracting methods, SUNO's new campus was reopened in record time for the spring semester with a Feb. 13, 2006, ribbon-cutting ceremony.



In addition to this feature article, we provide noteworthy news from our contracting organizations, including success stories and recognition of significant awards and contracting achievements.

We appreciate support from the field in providing material for publication, and we hope you find the submissions informative and interesting. If you need further information on any of the topics presented, contact Emily Clarke at (703) 604-7102 or emily.clarke@hqda.army.mil.

Ms. Tina Ballard

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Policy and Procurement)

Rebuilding a University — A Collaboration of Professionals

Improbable circumstances and uncanny timing brought a most unusual and highly unlikely pairing of organizations to accomplish the monumental task of rebuilding a campus for Southern University at New Orleans (SUNO) in less than three months.

On Aug. 29, 2005, one of the most horrific natural disasters that the United States has ever encountered forever changed the landscape of southern Louisiana and Mississippi — Hurricane Katrina. The storm left tens of thousands displaced or homeless and unknown numbers lost their lives. The devastation remnants still linger. Although this event has lost its appeal with the news media, the truth remains that this region will be rebuilding for many years to come.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), working under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, was charged with the daunting task of removing debris and rebuilding the affected regions of Louisiana and Mississippi. Early on, it was apparent that the sheer magnitude of the devastation, coupled with a severe shortage of contracting professionals — especially construction contracting experts — meant USACE would have to look to other Army agencies to supplement their contracting workforce.

The Army Contracting Agency-Northern Region answered the call by providing contracting professionals to assist in the



A contractor removes tree trunks uprooted during Hurricane Katrina as part of a massive effort by USACE to remove nearly 120 million cubic yards of debris — twice the amount collected during the Florida hurricanes in 2004. (U.S. Army photo by Daren Reehl.)